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introduCtion
Inspired by the work of Charles Tilly (1989), who highlighted the 
pivotal role that cities played in the historical genesis of the modern 
state in Europe, research undertaken in the Cities and Fragile States 
(CAFS) Programme of the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) has 
focused on the complex relationships between cities, state fragility 
and development in the contemporary era.
Our analytical approach to state fragility followed the Centre’s 
heuristic distinction between failed or crisis states, fragile states, 
resilient states and developmental states. These classifications do 
not represent a linear spectrum but rather a multidimensional 
one that takes into account the three core functions of modern 
states: security provision, the pursuit of economic growth and the 
maintenance of basic welfare for citizens. Within this framework, a 
developmental state is one that ensures the integrity of its borders 
and the personal security of its citizens, pursues policies and enforces 
institutions that promote economic growth, and ensures that growth 
translates into broad-based improvements in social welfare. A fragile 
or resilient state may fall short on one or two of these measures; 
a state that fails on all three counts can be considered a ‘failed’ or 
‘crisis’ state. We refer to transitions from crisis to fragility/resilience 
as state consolidation and from fragility/resilience to development 
as state transformation. 
The role of cities in contemporary processes of state consolidation 
and transformation was considered from two angles in our research. 
First, we examined social, economic and political dynamics at city-
level in relation to these three core state functions. After all, cities 
have always been the natural habitat of states. Accordingly, a broad 
understanding of urban material and social realities offers a useful 
compliment to analyses of state fragility that focus exclusively on 
the actors and institutions that comprise the state itself. Second, we 
considered cities from a macro-perspective as organic components 
of broader socio-economic and political systems: components that 
exert independent and identifiable effects on national, regional 
and global processes and events. 
The defining characteristics of urban settlements – demographic size, 
density and social diversity (Wirth 1938) – give rise to concentrated 
social, political and economic interactions between individuals 
and groups. These interactions generate a complex social and 
institutional milieu that has historically been associated with both 
dynamic development and conflict (Beall et al 2010). At best, 
‘urbanism’ – or the way of life associated with urban habitation 
– can be a stimulus for social integration, economic growth and 
political change. At worst, cities can become theatres of violent 
contestation between individuals and groups (Beall and Fox 2009). 
As our research demonstrates, the extent to which cities fulfill 
their developmental potential is intimately related to the political 
economy of state-building. 
Laissez-faire 
urBanisation and the 
PolitiCal eConomy oF 
inFormality
A defining characteristic of urbanism across the global South 
today is the phenomenon of informality. While the urban informal 
economy is often celebrated as a pro-active response by urban 
dwellers to difficult circumstance, from the perspective of state 
highlights: 
•  Informality has become a defining characteristic of 
urbanism in the global South as a result of laissez-faire 
urbanisation. While the informal economy provides 
the poor with access to critical goods and services and 
livelihood opportunities, it also creates opportunities for 
powerful non-state actors to emerge with strong incentives 
to obstruct formalisation and hence state consolidation.
•  Cities are uniquely prone to conflict in contexts of 
institutional multiplicity, but they are also spaces where 
constructive engagement between rivals can be most 
readily and successfully advanced. In some cases this 
implies forging a hybrid political settlement in which 
a non-state authority structure is recognised but 
circumscribed by the formal institutions of the state.  
•  Cities provide platforms and stimuli for political projects 
that impact on state consolidation and development. They 
are also spaces where such projects are most readily visible 






2consolidation and sustainable urban development, pervasive 
informality is highly problematic. Indeed, one of the key insights 
that emerged in the course of our research is the importance of 
recognising that state consolidation is, in essence, a process of 
formalising institutions that govern security, economic activity 
and the delivery of public goods.
Rapid urbanisation and urban growth over the past 30 years has 
been accompanied by a retreat of the state as an active force in 
managing urban affairs, including land and housing markets, 
public services and the urban economy. In some cases, this has 
been a passive process, or laissez-faire urbanisation, in which city 
expansion is not actively addressed by government authorities. 
In other cases we see governments actively withdrawing from 
cities, in some cases due to local political and economic dynamics 
and in others as a result of pressure from international actors to 
‘downsize’ the state through privatisation and deregulation. As a 
consequence, political and economic entrepreneurs have stepped 
into the breach as informal providers or regulators of key goods 
and services such as land, housing, water, policing, transport, 
credit provision and contract enforcement. There are effectively 
two aspects of this phenomenon that are problematic from a 
state-building perspective.
First, in many of the cities we studied, state actors such as politicians, 
bureaucrats and police personnel use their positions to extract 
rents from urban residents who, for one reason or another, are 
technically in violation of some law or planning regulation. In 
Kampala, for instance, the multi-million dollar urban transport 
industry remains beyond state regulation due to the participation 
of local and national politicians in the taxi business, robbing the 
state of a potentially lucrative revenue stream and making it 
impossible for planners to effectively manage congestion and 
ensure public safety (Goodfellow 2010). In Karachi and Dar es 
Salaam, state-actors are similarly implicated in land and housing 
markets (see Box 1). As a result, the very people who should be 
supporting the consolidation of state authority and legitimacy in 
the eyes of urban residents actually undermine the state and have 
powerful incentives to maintain the informal status quo.
A second dynamic is the emergence of non-state authorities 
who carve out fiefdoms within cities and establish their authority 
by providing (or regulating) critical goods and services where 
governments fail to do so. We see this dynamic at play in Managua, 
where gangs provide neighbourhood protection and finance 
themselves through drug rackets (Rodgers 2007); in Karachi, 
where social networks bound by ethnic and religious identities serve 
as an important mechanism of contract enforcement (Budhani et 
al 2010); and in the history of Colombian cities, where at times 
paramilitaries controlled the political economy of whole cities 
(Gutiérrez-Sanín et al 2009). Where rival authorities compete 
for control of urban space state consolidation is retarded and the 
spectre of state fragility remains. 
The emergence of intermediaries and powerful informal service 
providers in urban areas can be read as a consequence of state 
withdrawal (sometimes, it should be noted, due to unsustainable 
state over-reach) and as a contributing factor. Policies that 
contribute to state withdrawal or (unsustainable over-reach) are 
often evaluated on grounds of efficiency and equity, but almost 
never for their impact on the institutional resilience of the state. 
This is a major blind spot which has far-reaching consequences 
for the ability of states to embark upon or return to a path of 
institutional consolidation.
Box 1: the PolitiCal eConomy oF 
inFormality: KaraChi and dar es salaam 
Pakistan is a paradigmatic ‘fragile state’ as decades of political 
turmoil, violent Islamist insurgency and a poor record of growth 
and welfare attest. By contrast, Tanzania has shown remarkable 
resilience since independence having largely avoided the kinds of 
violent civil and civic conflicts that have plagued its neighbours. 
Despite these differences, an analysis of urban land and housing 
markets in Karachi and Dar es Salaam – the country’s dominant 
city in each case – reveals an interesting similarity that illustrates 
the underlying dynamics of state fragility in Pakistan and 
highlights a worrying trend in Tanzania.
In both Karachi and Dar es Salaam, government failure to 
effectively manage rapid demographic expansion has 
stimulated the growth of informal markets for land and housing. 
These markets serve as a source of rents for state actors (e.g. 
politicians, bureaucrats and police) who extract bribes from 
residents in return for ‘looking the other way’. In Karachi, 
informality has also fuelled the emergence of ethnically-based 
solidarity organisations and political parties that provide 
protection for their urban constituents – a development that 
has contributed to ethnic and political violence in the city. By 
contrast, the informal governance of urban land and housing 
markets in Dar es Salaam has served as a tool for the ruling CCM 
party to maintain its support base in urban areas at the expense 
of the rational execution of urban planning regulations.
These cases illustrate the hazards of laissez-faire urbanisation 
from a state-building perspective. Opportunities for state 
agents to generate rents by insulating urban residents from 
state regulation creates a situation in which those who should 
be working for state consolidation have a vested interest in 
obstructing it. Furthermore, informality creates spaces for 
powerful non-state actors to emerge, creating institutional 
multiplicity and competition for authority and legitimacy in cities. 
Sources: Budhani et al 2010; Kombe 2010; Fox 2010 
‘ Cities are strategic spaces in contexts of state 
fragility. The consolidation of government 
authority and legitimacy in urban settlements is 
a necessary (if insufficient) condition for ensuring 
state resilience and development.’
institutional 
multiPliCity and hyBrid 
PolitiCal settlements
The coexistence of rival authorities with competing claims to 
social and political legitimacy is a defining characteristic of state 
fragility and a situation referred to in CSRC research as institutional 
multiplicity. Institutional multiplicity is clearly not a specifically urban 
phenomenon, however it is in cities where confrontations between 
rival authorities (including both state and non-state actors) are 
most likely to take place and where the possibility for negotiated 
settlements between rivals is greatest. If state consolidation is 
understood as a process of formalisation, such settlements can serve 
as important stepping stones in processes of state consolidation 
and transformation. 
3‘ The extent to which states are embedded within 
towns and cities and are actively involved in the 
provision of security, the rule of law, economic 
regulation and public goods is a good indicator of 
their relative strength or fragility.’
Afghanistan provides a stark illustration of the challenges of 
institutional multiplicity. Military efforts to quash the Taliban have 
failed and alternative strategies of trying to incorporate diverse sites 
of authority into formal local and national government structures 
have not yet succeeded either (Beall and Esser 2005; Giustozzi 
2009). In an interesting contrast, during the transition to democracy 
the South African state managed to overcome initially violent 
confrontations with Zulu ethnic chauvinists drawing on traditional 
authorities by integrating key actors and institutions into formal state 
structures (Beall 2005). This is a prime example of a hybrid political 
settlement that recognises the legitimacy of a non-state authority 
structure while at the same time circumscribing its powers by a 
process of formalisation. In South Africa, the hybrid settlement served 
to deflect the potentially destabilising consequences of institutional 
multiplicity and contribute to state consolidation. Whether or not 
such a settlement is possible in Afghanistan remains to be seen.
An intriguing and potentially significant difference between 
these two cases is the extent to which the non-state authorities 
involved have vested interests in urban areas. In Afghanistan, the 
Taliban draw their support from rural areas and exhibit a clear 
disdain for the liberalism associated with life in the capital. In 
South Africa, a number of Zulu traditional authorities fall within 
Greater Durban, which means they have a keen interest in the 
direction of the city’s development. While this is suggestive of the 
power of urbanism to condition political negotiation, it is by no 
means definitive. Like Durban, the city of Kampala is a space of 
overlapping jurisdiction between customary rulers and the Ugandan 
state. Unlike Durban, a satisfactory hybrid political settlement has 
yet to be achieved: Bugandan leaders have no institutionalised role 
in the Ugandan state. Consequently conflicts persist between the 
two parties, sometimes leading to violence in the city (Goodfellow 
and Lindemann, 2010).
While some observers see the incorporation of traditional authorities 
into formal governance structure through hybrid political settlements 
as a throwback to colonial strategies of governance and antithetical 
to state consolidation (Mamdani 1996), it is instructive to consider 
the myriad hybrid arrangements that persist in ‘modern’ states. In 
Europe, for example, constitutional monarchies continue to exist 
alongside well-established and stable parliamentary democracies, 
highlighting the fact that hybrid political settlements evolve and can 
contribute to state consolidation and transformation in the long 
run.  The key question, from the viewpoint of policy intervention, is 
whether and to what extent a politically-negotiated incorporation 
of potential rival sources of authority and legitimacy might lead to 
the state consolidation or erosion in the medium to long term.
PolitiCal ProjeCts and 
develoPment
A close reading of the history of state-making in Europe indicates 
that modern states were not consciously ‘built’ but rather emerged 
as by-products of political projects by diverse social actors. Nation-
building was not pursued by rulers out of a benign interest 
in cultivating social harmony but rather to ensure support for 
aggressive military expansion and defence. The formalisation of 
legal structures, economic regulation and public goods provision 
were not inspired by an altruistic impulse to create conditions for 
broad-based growth but rather to ensure a steady flow of resources 
and to moderate popular dissent. Hybrid political settlements 
were not forged by rulers in the interests of peace but rather the 
maintenance of political power in the face of powerful rivals. As 
containers of sovereignty, as strategic logistical and financial hubs 
and theatres of negotiation between rival elites and between rulers 
and citizens, cities were central to these processes.
While contemporary circumstances in the global South are 
decidedly different, the significance of political projects in shaping 
trajectories of state consolidation and transformation, together 
with the role of cities in shaping these projects, is apparent in 
our research. A political project can be defined as a proactive 
effort on the part of significant (if small) groups within society to 
achieve one or more clearly articulated objectives. Perhaps the 
most obvious form of political project is nation-building, which 
features heavily in analyses of state consolidation in Europe and 
is apparent in several of our case studies.
A shared sense of national identity among diverse communities 
within a state’s boundaries can serve as an important facilitator 
of collective action in the face of external threats or domestic 
challenges. While the consolidation of nationalism is neither 
a necessary nor sufficient condition for the construction of 
developmental states (e.g. Spain or Italy), in contexts where 
tribal, ethnic or class identities correlate with political cleavages 
the promotion of a national identity that transcends such divisions 
can help to overcome them. In Tanzania, for example, the nation-
building project of the country’s post-colonial government, which 
actively sought to suppress ethnic and tribal divisions, is often 
cited as a contributing factor to the country’s resilience in the 
face of regional instability and protracted economic crisis (Putzel 
and Lindemann, 2010). And the city of Dar es Salaam, which 
has been characterised from its birth as a Creole city, provided 
a favourable social context from which to advance this project 
(Bryceson 2008).
However, nation-building projects can also be divisive and explosive 
in urban environments. The history of Ahemedabad demonstrates 
how cities can become focal points for nationalist projects that 
seek to marginalise particular communities. Ironically, the birthplace 
of Gandhi’s nation-building project has more recently suffered 
from a Hindu nationalist movement intent on marginalising 
India’s Muslim communities. Today, the city is a segregated space 
that accentuates group differences rather than attenuates them 
(Chandhoke 2009).
While nation-building is often the most legible form of political 
project, it is not the only one. Political projects can also be driven 
by coalitions oriented towards achieving more immediate and 
material objectives. In the Colombian cities of Medellin and Bogotá, 
for instance, an urban middle class fed up with the corruption 
and violence of traditional city politics supported the election of 
mayors dissociated from existing patronage structures, allowing 
them to successfully advance projects that improved the quality 
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of life in these cities while undermining the powerful non-state 
actors threatening to tear Colombian society (and the state) 
apart (see Box 2).
Political projects pose difficult questions for policy-makers, as 
development policy attempts to maintain neutrality between rival 
political positions within a given society. A great advantage of 
focusing on political projects, however, is that they tend to be 
relatively legible, as leaders or leading groups need to mobilise 
significant segments of the population in order to succeed. Even if 
development policy-making is constrained in maintaining a politically 
neutral posture, it would be irresponsible not to pay close attention to 
the political projects that influence development and state-building 
in countries and cities of intervention and interest.
ConClusion
Over the last 30 years the international development community 
has largely ignored cities and their potential contributions to 
development. In the meantime, laissez-faire urbanisation in the 
global South has been accompanied by the ‘urbanisation of 
poverty’ (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2007) and has created 
new challenges to state consolidation, transformation and socio-
economic development. In the years ahead, policy-makers are well-
advised to recalibrate priorities and recognise the complex linkages 
between cities and the political economy of development.
Box 2: PolitiCal ProjeCts in Bogotá  
and Kigali 
The clearest example of a developmental political project comes from 
our Bogotá research where two mayors in three successive terms were 
able to initiate and consolidate a process of urban renewal that led to 
improvements in security, urban transport and amenities across the 
city. These paved the way for wider urban governance reforms. An 
elite bargain saw the voluntary payment of increased local taxes in 
return for a process that delegitimised the previous violent political 
dispensation. The coalition also appealed to the aspirations of lower 
middle-class residents who benefitted from new amenities, safe 
and affordable transport and significant decline in homicide rates. 
Developed independently of central government, it is significant 
that Bogotá’s success has become something of a national cause 
célèbre. It is also perhaps no coincidence the mayors involved have 
shown evidence of national political ambitions.
In Rwanda, national political elites prevailed in the capital city. 
Kigali became central to efforts at incubating a national political 
identity aimed at moving the country beyond its tragically 
divisive ethnic conflict. Home to returning exiles and a ruling elite 
comfortable in both English and French, Kigali is subject to top-
down planning and development of staggering proportions as 
Rwanda strives economically to become the ‘Singapore of Africa’. 
This impressive example of a vertically integrated political project 
could well flounder due to the absence of an inclusive developmental 
coalition bringing the necessary ingredient of horizontal integration. 
Sources: Gutiérrez-Sanín et al 2009; Goodfellow and Smith 2010
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